Crimean operation 1918 |
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Tauride province |
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Liquidation of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Taurida |
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Opponents |
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Austria - Hungary |
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Commanders |
Robert von Kosch |
Slutsky, Anton Iosifovich Goldstein Lazarev |
Strengths of the parties |
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2nd Zaporozhye Regiment, 1st Cavalry Regiment named after. Kostya Gordienko, engineering kuren, horse-mountain artillery division, Pavlograd hussar regiment, three field batteries, a howitzer battery, an armored vehicle - mobile division, two armored trains, a detachment of motor boats, Crimean Tatar volunteers, Galician volunteers |
15th Landwehr Division |
3rd Bolshevik Army, Red Army of the Crimean Socialist Republic, long-range and heavy artillery |
Military losses |
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Minor |
Unknown |
Unknown |
Crimean operation 1918- a military campaign of a special group of the Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) under the command of Colonel Pyotr Bolbochan in April 1918 to the Crimea against the Bolsheviks with the aim of capturing the Black Sea Fleet by independent Ukraine. Despite the success of the operation, the main goals of the campaign were not achieved due to a conflict with the German command: some of the ships of the Black Sea Fleet were under Ukrainian flags for 24 hours, after which the fleet was partially captured by the Germans, partially scuttled, partially taken to Novorossiysk and in June flooded there.
Until November 1918 (until the signing of an agreement between Skoropadsky and the Commander-in-Chief of the AFSR Denikin), the UPR supported the land blockade of Crimea, including a ban on postal communications. In November 1918, letters arrived in Crimea for six months. Raising Ukrainian flags on the ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet was a political measure: the fleet command, career sailors, tried to save the fleet from being transferred to the Germans by raising Ukrainian flags, but from the very beginning it was clear that this would not help: the CR, then Skoropadsky were completely dependent on the occupying German troops .
Reasons and prerequisites for the operation
In the spring of 1918, the Kaiser's army, with the support of some collaborationist Ukrainian units, continued its victorious offensive against Russia. At the forefront of the German army was the Zaporozhye division of Colonel Peter Bolbochan. Two factors contributed to the successful and rapid advance of the Cossacks: firstly, the division’s troops moved along the main railway lines, not giving the enemy the opportunity to organize either a retreat or an effective defense. Secondly, as direct participants in those events recalled, at the time of the events in the spring of 1918, the Red Army was “robber, dissolute gangs” that could not “resist either the disciplined and compact masses of German troops or the young patriotic Ukrainian army.”
Zaporozhye Corps
On April 6, 1918, the Cossacks entered Kharkov. Without expecting an appointment from the government, Petr Bolbochan, with the consent of General Zurab Natiev, appointed Colonel Alexander Shapoval, commander of the 4th Zaporozhye Regiment named after. B. Khmelnitsky. A few days later - April 9, 1918 - the Zaporozhye division, by order of the War Ministry, was deployed to the Zaporozhye Corps, since during the liberation of the Poltava region from the Bolsheviks, the number of the Zaporozhye division increased, mainly due to Ukrainian intellectual youth. According to the plan of the UPR War Ministry, in the process of deploying a division into a corps, the 1st Division was supposed to separate the 2nd Division from its composition.
In the short time of its existence, the Zaporozhye Corps has become one of the most combat-ready Ukrainian combat units. His best unit was the 2nd Zaporizhian Foot Regiment under the command of Colonel Peter Bolbochan. The soldiers received new khaki uniforms of the English type. The cap was decorated with a cockade with national symbols. Petty officers' insignia are on the collar, the position is indicated by knots on the left sleeve, for petty officers - with gold braid, for Cossacks - with blue cloth. The military parade in Kharkov, which the 2nd Zaporizhian Foot Regiment under the command of Colonel Bolbochan held together with German troops, made a great impression on the population of the city and had significant propaganda value. After the parade, many senior officers and soldiers of the former Russian army joined the ranks of the Ukrainian army.
The meaning of Crimea
By that time, the UPR government had long been preparing to gain access to the Black Sea, understanding the importance of controlling the Black Sea coast. On December 21, 1917, the Central Rada approved the law “On the creation of the General Secretariat of Maritime Affairs” (Ukrainian: “On the establishment of the General Secretariat of Maritime Affairs”), which was headed by the famous Ukrainian politician Social Democratic Party Dmitry Antonovich. Later the Secretariat was transformed into the Ministry of the Navy. By its law of January 14, 1918, the Ukrainian People's Republic adopted the "Temporary Law on the Fleet of the Ukrainian People's Republic" (Ukrainian "Temporary Law on the Fleet of the Ukrainian People's Republic"), according to which the ships and ships of the fleet of the former Russian Empire on the Black Sea were proclaimed the fleet of the UPR . In turn, the Bolsheviks carried out a serious propaganda campaign in the navy. So, already at the end of January 1918, the Council of People's Commissars sent a telegram to Sevastopol about the creation of a workers' and peasants' red fleet “on a voluntary basis,” promising a payment that was twice the monetary support provided to the Black Sea people by the Ukrainian government. Strengthening the positions of the Bolsheviks in Crimea threatened the UPR to receive a fleet only on paper.
On the eve of the trip
Order of the CR
On April 10, 1918, the day after the division was reorganized into a corps, the headquarters of the Cossacks received a secret oral order from the Minister of War Alexander Zhukovsky of the General Secretariat of the UPR. General Zurab Natiev was to allocate a separate group from the corps, provided with all types of weapons as a division, under the command of Colonel Bolbochan. He was given a separate strategic task: ahead of the German troops on the Kharkov-Lozovaya-Aleksandrovsk-Perekop-Sevastopol line, to liberate the Crimean Peninsula from the Bolsheviks and capture Sevastopol. The ultimate goal of the operation was to be the Black Sea Fleet, stationed in the Sevastopol Bay, which was planned to be included in the Ukrainian armed forces. During the operation, Peter Bolbochan’s group was also tasked with seizing military property of the Crimean ports.
Another group of the Zaporozhye Corps under the command of General Natiev was supposed to move in the Lozovaya-Slavyansk direction to liberate the Donetsk basin from the Bolshevik units. General Natiev personally handled the organization and dispatch of this unit, entrusting Peter Bolbochan with command of the Crimean group.
Sergei Shemet, a close friend of Colonel Bolbochan, later recalled in his memoirs:
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“Throughout the entire march of the corps from Kyiv to Kharkov, direct control of the units during combat operations was carried out by Colonel P. Bolbochan, while General Natiev was forced to devote all his time to organizing the units hastily assembled in Kiev and sent on the campaign. Natiev knew how to evaluate the merits of his assistants and was not afraid of competition from those whose merits rose above the general level, so he was not afraid to nominate Bolbochan and appoint him commander of the first division of the Zaporozhye Corps, and was not afraid to let Bolbochan and his division complete a separate task - the liberation of Crimea from the Bolsheviks , although this assignment obviously gave him the opportunity to rise even higher in the eyes of the Government and society.” |
Negotiations with the Germans
On the eve of crossing Sivash, Pyotr Bolbochan met with General von Kosch, commander of the 15th Landwehr Division, which was advancing on the Crimea following Bolbochan’s group. The general informed the colonel about the intention of the German command of the corps forces, with the support of the fleet, to carry out an operation to seize Crimea. Having a secret mission from the Ukrainian government to get ahead of the Germans and capture the Crimean Peninsula before them, the Cossacks were preparing to take Perekop on their own. Pyotr Bolbochan, as a division commander and a lower-ranking officer, was forced to admit his subordination to the German general, but refused the offered assistance - German combat units and armored trains that were supposed to arrive in Melitopol.
The German command was quite skeptical about the plans of the Cossacks, given the enemy’s advantageous defensive position: at Perekop, the Bolsheviks could hold back the numerically superior enemy forces even with insignificant forces, and at Sivash, natural conditions made the crossings almost impregnable. The Germans considered it impossible to take Perekop without heavy artillery, which was soon to be at the disposal of the 15th Landwehr Division, and perceived Bolbochan's intentions as a senseless, daring undertaking. Perhaps this is what prompted the Germans to allow the Cossacks to attack the Crimea.
Development of the military operation
The Crimean group included the 2nd Zaporozhye Regiment, the 1st Cavalry Regiment named after. Kostya Gordienko, engineering kuren, horse-mountain artillery division, three field and one howitzer batteries, an armored car division and two armored trains.
The 1st and 3rd Zaporozhye regiments, the 3rd Gaidamak regiment (specially arrived from Kyiv), artillery and engineering regiments entered the Donetsk group under the command of Colonel Sikevich, commander of the 3rd Gaidamak regiment.
Advancement of Ukrainian troops to the south
On April 13, 1918, units of the Crimean group moved south, from Kharkov to Lozovaya. From there they launched an offensive in the Sevastopol direction and on April 14, after short battles, occupied Aleksandrovsk. In Aleksandrovsk, the Cossacks met with the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen, who were advancing with the Austrian army from the Right Bank.
On April 18, the advanced units of the Crimean group approached Melitopol, which had already been cleared from the Bolsheviks during a stubborn battle on April 16 (April 3), 1918 by a detachment of Colonel Drozdovsky: 98-106. After the loss of Melitopol, the Bolsheviks retreated to the Sivash positions. In Melitopol, food and weapons warehouses, cars, planes and motor boats fell into the hands of Ukrainian units.
Moving forward, Ukrainian units constantly pressed the retreating enemy, attacking with cavalry and infantry in vehicles. As a result, on April 21, 1918, units of the Crimean group occupied Novoalekseevka - the last station before the Sivash bridge - and came close to the crossings.
Sivash breakthrough
On Sivash, the Bolsheviks already had more powerful and organized fortifications than in the surrounding settlements. Despite this, Ukrainian troops effectively captured enemy positions within a day.
The lightning operation to capture the Sivash crossing, carried out by Colonel Bolbochan, saved the Zaporozhye division from significant losses of personnel and ensured its rapid further advance deeper into the Crimean Peninsula. When preparing a breakthrough, the division headquarters made significant efforts to misinform the enemy; the psychological factor of the “traditionality” of breaking through such fortifications was also taken into account. A direct participant in those events, centurion Boris Monkevich wrote in his memoirs:
Thus, on the night of April 22, 1918, the first hundred of the 2nd Zaporozhye Regiment, under the command of Centurion Zelinsky, quickly crossed the mined bridge on motorized tires and neutralized the explosives. Just beyond this, two armored trains crossed the bridge. The Bolsheviks, not expecting such a decisive attack, did not have time to begin defending the crossing - the armored trains freely reached the line of enemy fortifications and sowed panic among the defenders with machine-gun and artillery fire. The attack on the positions of the “Reds” of Zelinsky’s hundred finally forced the Bolsheviks to abandon their positions. By that time, the 2nd Regiment had managed to cross the bridge, which immediately occupied the abandoned fortifications.
Offensive
On the evening of April 22, 1918, the Crimean group captured the city of Dzhankoy, the first junction in Crimea, which gave it the opportunity to launch a subsequent offensive. Here all the forces of the derivative group concentrated and began to advance further in three parts: the first part, which consisted of infantry, armored cars and artillery, advanced along the eastern side of the railway beyond the Dzhankoy-Simferopol route, the second part (Gordienkiwsky regiment and horse-mountain cannon division) moved to direction of Evpatoria, and the third part went to Feodosia.
Against the background of political mistakes and military defeats of the Central Council, the military raid of the 1st Zaporozhye Division looked like a brilliant military campaign, which had extraordinary geopolitical significance and soon ensured that Ukraine would receive the Black Sea Fleet.
The level of discipline among the Cossacks was high throughout the entire operation - the Cossacks and foremen highly valued Pyotr Bolbochan, respect for him and his authority were undoubted. This had another, perhaps somewhat unexpected, consequence: the attitude of the soldiers of the Zaporozhye division towards their commander was perceived with suspicion by the leadership of the UPR military department - there were whispers about the colonel’s seemingly dictatorial ambitions.
During the Crimean campaign, the Zaporozhye division was replenished with a significant number of volunteers from Tavria, as well as Tatar volunteer formations. Colonel Petro Bolbochan intended to create a separate regular unit out of them, but in accordance with the existing agreements of the Ukrainian government with the German command, he was forced to disband these volunteer detachments. However, many volunteers from Crimea joined the Zaporozhye division in Melitopol.
The main forces of Bolbochan's group were sent to Simferopol, which was captured almost without resistance on the morning of April 24, 1918. Around the same time, the Gordienkivsky regiment captured Bakhchisarai.
An eyewitness wrote:
“Nowhere in all of Ukraine have the Ukrainian troops been greeted with such enthusiasm, with such applause and with such enthusiasm as the population of Simferopol and other occupied Crimean areas did.” But then the Ukrainian troops were forced to stop their offensive.
Confrontation with the Germans
As is known, the Crimean campaign was carried out following a secret oral order from the government and the Ministry of Military Affairs of the UPR. Despite the German proposals during the Brest-Litovsk negotiations to include Crimea in the sphere of national interests of the UPR, the Ukrainian delegation refused to do this, arguing their refusal by the right of the Tatar people to self-determination. However, subsequently the government of Vsevolod Golubovich decided on a military operation, although even a month before the start of the campaign - March 9, 1918 - at a meeting of the Council of People's Ministers, Minister of Internal Affairs Mikhail Tkachenko stated:
“...it is impossible to rely on our army, and because of this it is necessary to clear the territory of Ukraine with the help of the Germans...”
Such inconsistency of the government and its members once again demonstrated the lack of a clear and unambiguous state policy among the leaders of the UPR, who were guided primarily by party programs. The successes of the Ukrainian troops in the Crimean military campaign clearly demonstrated the unprofessionalism and narrow political bias of many members of the Ukrainian government. As a result, the military potential and brilliant victories of the Zaporozhye division were not used, and it itself actually came under the threat of liquidation by German troops. The reason was very simple: after the successful operations of the Cossacks near Oleksandrivsk and Melitopol and after the successful crossing of the Sivash, the German military command began to express concern about the actions of the Ukrainian troops. Trying to contain their advance, the commander of the 15th German Landwehr Division, General von Kosch, from the order of his command, began to demand the cessation of operations of Ukrainian military units. After the Cossacks liberated Dzhankoy, and later Simferopol, relations between Ukrainians and Germans worsened even more.
Ultimatum von Kosch
On April 26, 1918, the 15th German Division, by order of General von Kosch, surrounded all the locations of Ukrainian troops and the main strategic points of Simferopol. Colonel Peter Bolbochan was given an ultimatum - to immediately lay down his arms, leave all military property and leave the city and the territory of Crimea under the protection of a German convoy as internees, while disbanding the volunteer detachments. Explaining the reason for his demands, General von Kosch stated that, according to the terms of the Brest Peace, Crimea does not belong to the territory of Ukraine and there is no reason for the presence of Ukrainian troops on this land. To the protests of the commander of the Cossacks, the answer was given that the Ministry of Military Affairs of the UPR responded to requests from the German command that “it knows absolutely nothing about such a group and did not give any assignments for operations in Crimea to any department; The Ukrainian Government considers Crimea to be a completely independent state.”
The group's exit from Crimea
On April 27, 1918, the Minister of Military Affairs of the UPR, Alexander Zhukovsky, gave an order by telephone for the immediate withdrawal of the Zaporozhye division from Crimea, which was announced in the presence of General von Kosch. Ataman 3urab Natiev expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that he left the group that carried out the military operation in the Donbass, and General von Kosch was informed that the previous statement of the UPR government, which stated that there were no Ukrainian military units in Crimea “was simply a misunderstanding” . The minister noted:
“The government did not hope that the Group was already operating in Crimea; negotiations with the German high command had just begun.” Only later did Colonel Petr Bolbochan learn that neither the Minister of War nor the Ukrainian government took any measures before the German high command to save the Crimean Group. The Cossacks never received an order about the location of the new deployment. After meetings with the corps commander, 3urab Natievim, it was decided to retreat to Melitopol, where the hetman’s coup took place.
As a result, the Crimean group of the Ukrainian army, which was threatened by disarmament by the Germans, was withdrawn from Crimea and located near Oleksandrivsk.
Results
Despite the controversial nature and the forced abandonment of conquered positions, the Crimean campaign of the Zaporozhye division demonstrated the ability of the Ukrainian army to carry out complex military operations and revealed the talent of Colonel Petro Bolbochan as a capable military leader. The main goals of the campaign were nevertheless achieved: on April 29, 1918, under the influence of events, the ships of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol raised the Ukrainian national flag. The fleet leadership announced its subordination to the government in Kyiv. (But on April 29, 1918, the Central Rada was dissolved, Skoropadsky was proclaimed Hetman of Ukraine. The “Ukrainian State” was proclaimed in its place.)
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“On April 29, on the dreadnought Volya, the next delegate meeting, by a small majority of votes, decided to transfer command to Sablin (he had resigned a few days before) and raise the Ukrainian flags. In protest against this decision, representatives of the mine brigade left the dreadnought. Sablin arrived and told the meeting , that the Black Sea Fleet is the property of the entire Russian people, including the Ukrainian, which the fleet will preserve, while the Bolsheviks are dooming it to destruction. The admiral saw the only way to save the fleet was to raise the Ukrainian flags and remain in Sevastopol. After returning Sablin sent a telegram to the command in Kiev: "Today, the Sevastopol fortress and the fleet located in Sevastopol raised the Ukrainian flags. Rear Admiral Sablin took command of the fleet."...... After sending the telegram to Kiev, Sablin contacted the German command, reported about his assumption of office and asked to receive the delegation.The Fleet Commander stopped all relations with the People's Commissariat for Maritime Affairs in Moscow. The commander of the Black Sea Fleet ordered the ships to raise Ukrainian flags. By 18.00 on April 29, the battleships, cruisers and several destroyers lowered their red flags. Most destroyers refused to do this. The destroyer Kerch raised a signal on its topmast: “Shame and sale of the fleet.” |
Today, this page of the history of Ukraine has been unfairly forgotten by modern Ukrainian historians - the Crimean events of the spring of 1918 are reflected for the most part on the pages of personal memoirs of combatants and close friends of Colonel Bolbochan.
Goldstein
Lazarev P. S.
Crimean operation 1918- operation of the Crimean Group of Forces of the Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) under the command of P. F. Bolbochan in April 1918 - a campaign in Crimea with the aim of overthrowing Soviet power, establishing control over the peninsula and capturing the Black Sea Fleet.
Despite the partial success of the operation (the defeat of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Taurida), its main goals were not achieved due to a conflict with the command of the German occupation forces introduced into the territory of Ukraine by agreement with the Ukrainian Central Rada: some of the ships of the Black Sea Fleet were under Ukrainian flags for only a day , after which the fleet was partially captured by the Germans, partially scuttled, and partially taken away by the teams to Novorossiysk, where it was later also scuttled. Raising Ukrainian flags on ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet was a political measure: in this way, the fleet command tried to save the fleet from being transferred to the Germans, although from the very beginning it was clear that this would not help: both the Central Rada and Hetman Skoropadsky, who dispersed it, were completely dependent on the German occupation forces .
Subsequently, until November 1918, when an agreement was signed between Hetman Skoropadsky and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia, General Denikin, the Ukrainian state carried out a land blockade of Crimea, including a ban on postal communications.
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Subtitles
Reasons and prerequisites for the operation
The Zaporozhye Corps was one of the most combat-ready Ukrainian military formations, and the 2nd Zaporozhye Foot Regiment was one of its best units. The personnel received new khaki uniforms of the English design. The caps were decorated with cockades with national symbols. The military parade in Kharkov, in which the 2nd Zaporizhian Foot Regiment took part together with German troops, made a great impression on the population of the city. After the parade, many senior officers and soldiers of the former Russian army began to join the Ukrainian army.
The meaning of Crimea
By this time, the UPR government had long been preparing to establish control over the Black Sea coast, understanding the significance of this for the existence of the Ukrainian state. On December 21, 1917, the Central Rada adopted the law “On the creation of the General Secretariat of Maritime Affairs” (Ukrainian. “About the approval of the General Secretariat of Maritime Certificates”), which was headed by the famous Ukrainian politician D. V. Antonovich. Later the Secretariat was transformed into the Ministry of the Navy. On January 14, 1918, the “Temporary Law on the Navy of the Ukrainian People’s Republic” (Ukrainian) was adopted. “Temporary Law on the Navy of the Ukrainian People’s Republic”), according to which the ships and ships of the fleet of the former Russian Empire on the Black Sea were proclaimed the fleet of the UPR.
In turn, the Bolsheviks carried out a serious propaganda campaign in the navy. Thus, already at the end of January 1918, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR sent a telegram to Sevastopol about the creation of a workers' and peasants' red fleet “on a voluntary basis,” promising a salary twice as high as the monetary support provided to the Black Sea residents by the Ukrainian government. Strengthening the positions of the Bolsheviks in Crimea could lead to the fact that the UPR fleet would exist only on paper.
On the eve of the trip
Order of the Minister of War of the UPR
The Crimean group included the 2nd Zaporozhye Regiment, the 1st Kostya Gordienko Cavalry Regiment, an engineering kuren, a horse-mountain artillery division, three field and one howitzer batteries, an armored car division and two armored trains.
Sergei Shemet, a close friend of Colonel Bolbochan, later recalled in his memoirs:
Throughout the entire march of the corps from Kyiv to Kharkov, direct control of the units during hostilities was carried out by Colonel P. Bolbochan, while General Natiev was forced to devote all his time to the organization of units, hastily assembled in Kiev and sent on the campaign.
Natiev knew how to appreciate the merits of his assistants and was not afraid of competition from those whose merits rose above the general level, so he was not afraid to promote Bolbochan and appoint him commander of the first division of the Zaporozhye Corps, he was not afraid to give Bolbochan and his division a separate task - the liberation of Crimea from the Bolsheviks, although this assignment obviously gave him the opportunity to rise even higher in the eyes of the government and society.
Original text (Ukrainian)
“During this entire campaign of the corps from Kiev to Kharkov, Colonel P. Bolbochan carried out the entire march of the corps from Kiev to Kharkov, and at that time General Natiyev, in the midst of confusion, spent all his time giving the right to organize the elections for the Swede in Kiev. Eva and messages from the part of the campaign.
They were able to appreciate the merits of their lieutenants and were not afraid of competition from those whose merits had risen above their peers, so they were not afraid to stick in front of Bolbochan and recognize him as the commander of the First Division. Zie Zaporizhsky Corps, not afraid of the date of Bolbochanov and his division viscont near the assignment - liberation of Crimea from Bolsheviks, although this agreement obviously gave him the opportunity to rise in the eyes of the Order and Supremacy even more.”
Progress of the operation
Advancement of Ukrainian troops to the south
Negotiations with the Germans
On the eve of the crossing of Sivash, Bolbochan met with General von Kosch, commander of the 15th Landwehr Division, which was advancing on the Crimea following Bolbochan’s group. The general informed Bolbochan about the intention of the German command of the corps forces, with the support of the fleet, to carry out an operation to seize Crimea. Having a secret order from the UPR government to get ahead of the Germans and be the first to capture the Crimean Peninsula, the Cossacks were preparing to take Perekop on their own. Bolbochan, as a division commander and a lower-ranking officer, was forced to admit his subordination to the German general, but refused the offered help - German combat units and armored trains that were supposed to arrive in Melitopol. The German command was quite skeptical about the plans of the Cossacks, given the advantageous defensive position of the enemy: at Perekop, Soviet troops could, even with insignificant forces, hold back the numerically superior forces of the attackers, and the natural conditions of Sivash made the crossing almost impossible. The Germans considered it impossible to take Perekop without heavy artillery, which was supposed to be at the disposal of the 15th Landwehr Division in the near future, and perceived Bolbochan's intentions as a senseless daring undertaking. Perhaps this is what prompted the Germans not to interfere with the advance of the Cossacks into the Crimea.
Breakthrough through Sivash
On Sivash, the Soviet troops had more powerful and organized fortifications than in the surrounding settlements. Despite this, Ukrainian troops captured the positions of the defenders within a day.
The lightning-fast operation to capture the Sivash crossing, carried out by Bolbochan, saved the Crimean group from significant losses and ensured its rapid advance deep into the Crimean peninsula. When preparing a breakthrough, the group headquarters made significant efforts to misinform the enemy, and also took into account the psychological factor of the “traditionality” of breaking through such fortifications. A direct participant in those events, centurion Boris Monkevich, wrote in his memoirs:
“Under such favorable conditions as the Bolsheviks’ lack of information and their inattention in defending the crossings, Bolbochan discarded his previous plan of crossing Sivash with motor boats and decided to seize the railway crossing directly in a sudden attack.”
Original text (Ukrainian)
“With such prevailing thoughts as the lack of information of the Bolsheviks and their disrespect for the right to defend the crossings, Bolbochan brought to the foreground the fording of Sivash with motor boats and decided with a rapt swoop to try to get an interesting crossing in the middle.” [ ]
Offensive
On the evening of April 22, the Crimean group captured the city of Dzhankoy, the first junction in Crimea, which gave it the opportunity to launch a subsequent offensive. Here all the forces of Bolbochan’s group concentrated and began to advance further in three directions: One part of the troops, consisting of infantry, armored cars and artillery, advanced along the eastern side of the Dzhankoy-Simferopol railway, the second part (Gordienkovsky regiment and horse-mountain cannon division) moved to direction of Evpatoria, and the third part went to Feodosia.
The level of discipline among the Cossacks was high throughout the entire operation - the Cossacks and foremen highly valued Pyotr Bolbochan, respect for him and his authority were undoubted. This had another, perhaps unexpected, consequence: the attitude of the soldiers of the Zaporozhye division towards their commander was viewed with suspicion by the leadership of the UPR military department - rumors began to circulate about the dictatorial ambitions of the colonel.
During the Crimean campaign, the Zaporozhye division was replenished with a significant number of volunteers from Tavria, as well as Tatar volunteer formations. Colonel Bolbochan intended to create a separate regular unit out of them, however, taking into account the existing agreements between the Ukrainian government and the German command, he was forced to disband these volunteer detachments. At the same time, many volunteers from Crimea joined the Zaporozhye division back in Melitopol [ ] .
The main forces of Bolbochan's group were sent to Simferopol, which was captured almost without resistance on the morning of April 24. Around the same time, the Gordienkovsky regiment captured Bakhchisarai.
Ultimatum von Kosch
On April 26, the 15th German Division, by order of General von Kosch, surrounded all the locations of Ukrainian troops and the main strategic points of Simferopol. Colonel Bolbochan was given an ultimatum - to immediately lay down his arms, leave all military property and leave the city and territory of Crimea under the protection of a German convoy as internees, while disbanding the volunteer detachments. Explaining the reason for his demands, General von Kosch stated that, according to the terms of the Brest Peace, Crimea does not belong to the territory of Ukraine and there is no reason for the presence of Ukrainian troops here. To the protests of the commander of the Cossacks, the answer was given that the Ministry of Military Affairs of the UPR responded to requests from the German command that “it knows absolutely nothing about such a group and did not give any assignments for operations in Crimea; The Ukrainian government considers Crimea an independent state" due to the fact that he left the group that carried out the military operation in the Donbass, and General von Kosch was told that the previous statement of the UPR government, which stated that there were no Ukrainian military units in Crimea, " It was just a misunderstanding."
Only later did Colonel Bolbochan learn that neither the Minister of War nor the Ukrainian government had taken any steps to save the Crimean group.
The Cossacks never received an order about the location of the new deployment. After a meeting with the corps commander 3urab Natiev, it was decided to retreat to Melitopol, where the Cossacks learned that General Skoropadsky had been declared hetman of all Ukraine and power had changed in Kyiv [ ] .
As a result, the Crimean group, which was threatened with disarmament, was withdrawn from Crimea and located near Aleksandrovsk.
Departure of the fleet from Sevastopol
Sablin allowed ships that did not want to lower the red flag to leave the bay before midnight. That same night, almost the entire fleet of destroyers and 3-4 transports with Soviet troops loaded into them left for Novorossiysk. However, von Kosch refused to receive parliamentarians, citing the fact that he needed a written appeal, which he would send to his command, which would take 2 weeks. On May 1, the Germans approached the city, occupying and fortifying its northern areas with machine guns. Sablin ordered the remaining ships to leave the bay. The ships came out under fire, but Sablin forbade returning fire so as not to be accused of violating the treaty. Due to the panic, 2 ships were damaged and remained in the bay.
Results
Despite the controversial nature and the forced abandonment of conquered positions, the Crimean campaign of the Zaporozhye division demonstrated the ability of the Ukrainian army to carry out complex military operations and revealed the talent of Colonel Petro Bolbochan as a capable military leader. The main goals of the campaign were not fulfilled, but cleared the way for German troops: on April 29, 1918, under the influence of events and to save the fleet from the Germans, the fleet leadership announced its subordination to the government in Kyiv [journal]. - St. Petersburg. : “Printing house named after. Ivan Fedorov", 1992. - No. 4. - P. 98-111; 1993; No. 5. - P. 80-88; No. 6. - pp. 127-143.
In April 1918, German troops occupied the entire peninsula. Soviet power in Crimea was temporarily liquidated. The Ukrainian Haidamaks, who were part of the German troops, were immediately removed from it after the occupation of Crimea. The Germans viewed the population of Crimea as “native inhabitants of German colonies.” This was openly published in newspapers and in various advertisements.
General Robert Kosh issued an order in Crimea for the population to surrender all weapons within three days. He threatened that anyone who did not carry out his orders and instructions would be punished “with all the severity of German wartime laws.”
In pursuance of Kosch's order, local German commandants issued their orders and announcements, which, as a rule, ended with the threat of the death penalty. These were not simple threats: in the first days of the occupation of Crimea, seven workers were shot in Feodosia.
Soon, the Germans shot two more workers: a Ukrainian, Savenko, and a Crimean Tatar, Dzhenaev, for failure to surrender their weapons. A notice about their execution was posted throughout the city “for general information.” The Germans also made executions obsolete in other cities of Crimea such as Simferopol, Sevastopol, Kerch, Yalta, etc.
When the Germans occupied Crimea and approached Sevastopol, V.I. Lenin transferred the Black Sea Fleet to Novorossiysk on April 29-30. On May 2, 1918, the German ship Goeben and the Turkish Hamidiye entered Sevastopol.
On May 3-4, the Germans raised German flags on the Russian ships remaining in Sevastopol. The Germans appointed Captain 1st Rank Ostrogradsky as the naval representative of Ukraine. But Ostrogradsky had no power in Sevastopol. The German government and military command did not know how to govern Crimea, and therefore the Germans decided to create a government in Crimea. On June 6, the commander of the German troops on the peninsula, German General Robert Kosch, entrusted the formation of the government to Lieutenant General Suleiman Sulkevich. Lithuanian Tatar, general of the tsarist army, commander of the 1st Muslim Corps, Suleiman (Matvey) Sulkevich turned out to be a suitable compromise figure. Kosh wrote to Sulkevich: “The German command will provide you with full assistance in maintaining order in the country.”
On June 21, the newspapers published the composition of the government, which included, in addition to General Sulkevich, the former Tauride vice-governor, Prince S. Gorchakov, large Crimean landowners: the German P. Rapp, V. Nalbandov; Count Tatishchev, L. Friedman and J. Seydamet. On June 25, 1918, the Crimean regional government was formed.
On June 10, S. Sulkevich instructed staff captain Baron Schmidt von der Launnz to go to Kyiv as an attaché together with the plenipotentiary representative of the Crimean government to the government of the Ukrainian State V.I. Kolensky. This mission, despite the favorable reaction of some Kyiv ministers, turned out to be completely unsuccessful. It came to border conflicts, a customs war and a breakdown in postal and telegraph communications between two that considered themselves sovereign entities occupied by one country. Ukraine has actually declared an economic blockade of Crimea.
Until 1917, up to 25 thousand heads of cattle, 90 thousand pounds of dairy products, 12 thousand pigs, 100 thousand sheep, 623 thousand pounds of sugar, 23 million pounds of coal, 1 million pounds of petroleum products were annually imported into Crimea . Through the ports of Crimea, 3 million pounds of iron ore, 12 million pounds of salt, 6 million pounds of grain, 1 million buckets of wine, 230 thousand pounds of tobacco, 50 thousand pounds of wool were exported abroad annually. The financial situation of the ordinary population of Crimean cities worsened. Food prices rose.
From April to August 1918, prices increased: for butter - more than twice, for eggs - almost twice, for cereals - three times. The shortage of bread was especially acute, and therefore bread standards were introduced in some cities. In Yalta, the bread norm was set at 200 grams for adults and 100 grams for children. The supply of bread to markets stopped. Bread could only be bought from speculators at a very high price. There were queues outside the bread shops in the evening. Ordinary people, not having the means to buy food at speculative prices, were starving. However, the days of German power in Crimea were numbered.
Having been defeated in the war, in early November Kaiser Wilhelm fled from Germany, and on November 11, 1918, Germany capitulated and the Germans left Crimea, and the government of S. Sulkevich could no longer exist without the support of the Germans and fell on November 16, 1918.
The February Revolution in Russia of 1917, which Russian liberals pass off as the “great people's revolution,” is most likely the result of a top conspiracy of representatives of big capital, the generals and the liberal intelligentsia of the Anglo-American orientation. In the First World War, the Russian Empire took on a large burden, which it would have coped with if that fateful February had not happened. It was he who, superimposed on the country in a state of war, led to such an overexertion of forces, which led to the appearance of a hernia in the most vulnerable place - in the underbelly of Russia. The Ukrainian People's Republic appeared on the political map as the embodiment of the separatist aspirations of the artificially created “Ukrainian nation” according to the Polish-Austro-German project.
Original taken from skif_tag in Occupation of Crimea
Well, no matter how you get used to it) It’s 1918, the Germans. Kerch, Sevastopol, Simferopol, Yalta...
Svyatoslav Shramchenko: “The 29th of April 1918 was a miracle day. Sevastopol raid viliskuv yak lustro. In year. 16. The flask ship of the Black Sea Fleet, the line ship “Georgiy Pobedonosets”, on the orders of the fleet commander, sent a signal: “The fleet will raise the Ukrainian ensign!” On most of the ships the command was heard: “Get on board!” On this command, in the old way, as was the case in the military Black Sea Fleet, not yet unleashed by the revolution, the sailors stood on board facing the middle of the ship. “On the ensign and the guy - string!” Present the Ukrainian ensign!” Under the surmies and whistles of the senior sailors, sailor's chests flew over the hill, blue flags rose over the whole Fleet and began to rustle in the wind.”
On April 30, 1918, 600 ships of the fleet with 3.5 thousand sailors on board left Sevastopol, heading for Novorossiysk, intending to come under Red command there. Part of the Black Sea Fleet (7 battleships, 3 cruisers, 5 destroyers) remained in Sevastopol harbor, led by Rear Admiral M. Ostrogradsky. On the same day, German troops began to enter Sevastopol, abandoned by its defenders. (Savchenko V. A.)
“Having arrived in Crimea, the Germans immediately tried to impose their own rules, sometimes forgetting our purely Russian characteristics - little culture and lack of habit of regulating the entire way of life, which is why sometimes all their good intentions were dashed without making significant changes in life.
By the way, the Germans tried to introduce railway traffic. The rules on the road are the same as in Germany, and when I received a ticket, I did not go out onto the platform, as usual, but found myself in a huge crowd, tightly squeezed along the corridor and waiting for the moment the door opened. The conductor stood at the door, expecting that, as in Germany, everyone would present a ticket for control and decorously go to take their place. To help him, keeping in mind that this was Russia and not Germany, they gave him two soldiers.
The crowd waited long and patiently, barely able to withstand the desperate stuffiness and heat. Finally, the train arrived, the door opened, and... at the same moment the conductor and the soldiers were crushed, the crowd, like a stormy stream, poured out onto the platform, and now the whole train was jam-packed... In vain the Germans insisted that “you can’t stay while moving.” on the platform,” they argued in vain that the stairs and roofs were no place for passengers - the carriages were tightly occupied, and the surprised Germans had to capitulate, especially since the wire fence they had made around the station was immediately torn down to the ground and there were, perhaps, more free passengers , rather than paid ones.
This is how the Germans’ desire to impose their own rules on us ended sadly, and soon they gave up on it everywhere, leaving half of the train for themselves in each train and leaving an endless number of passengers to fit as and where they wanted, to clog the landings and stairs, to fall and break.
Everywhere at the stations there are characteristic German helmets, everywhere there are guards with rifles, and in some places - machine guns. On the road, the only conversation is about the Germans, surprise at their order, discipline, politeness and habit of paying. In Sevastopol, the same cannons, menacingly aimed, along the streets, machine guns on balconies, officers and soldiers endlessly, neat carts, tightly covered with tarpaulins, marching platoons and ranks, horse and foot patrols and the complete absence of that impudent sailor crowd that was so popular in December stood out sharply.
The last minutes of Bolshevik Sevastopol - its agony, did not last long. The Germans, having said goodbye to the Ukrainians in Simferopol, who in their “villainous” spirit did not approach them at all, quickly rolled towards Sevastopol, encountering insignificant resistance from the sailors, despite the screaming red posters, which indicated that it would be more likely for all the sailors to lie down than the Germans will be in Sevastopol.
The panic that arose among red Sevastopol defies description, and all these December and February murderers, robbers of Crimean cities - like a herd of sheep, climbed into transports with looted goods, filling them beyond measure. (from the memoirs of N.N. Krishchevsky, Lieutenant Colonel of the 6th Marine Regiment and Border Guard)
7 old battleships, 3 cruisers, 11 destroyers, 16 submarines and 4 mother ships remained in Sevastopol. These ships and port facilities were not blown up, since the subversive party formed the day before fled. On these ships, by order of Rear Admiral M.M. Ostrogradsky, the Ukrainian flag was raised, but the German command immediately began to control them.
When the Germans entered Sevastopol, the flags (including Ukrainian ones) remaining on abandoned ships began to lower and gradually raise their own, German ones, in their place. Although, as eyewitnesses recalled, the UPR flags remained on some ships for some time. The German command did not intend to transfer warships to Ukraine in the spring of 1918.
(Alexander Danilov)
A hundred years ago - in mid-April 1918 - a special military group of the UPR army was formed, led by Lieutenant Colonel Pyotr Bolbachan, which went to the Crimea from the Kharkov region and in the same month, overcoming the Bolshevik defenses, entered the Crimean peninsula.
However, the further advance of the Ukrainian troops was prevented not by enemies, but by allied German troops. More about those events Radio Liberty said the Ukrainian historian.
Previously Crimea.Realities prepared a series of publications “Forgotten Victory” about the campaign of the UPR army group led by Bolbochan to the Crimea. The beginning of a series of publications.
‒ When the Ukrainian People's Republic was proclaimed and its territory was determined, Crimea was not called part of the UPR. Then there were peace negotiations in Brest with Germany and its allies, where the Ukrainians also did not raise the question of Crimea’s ownership. And here the decision is made that Ukrainian troops are going to Crimea. Who, how and why made this decision?
- It is quite obvious that the decision on this campaign was made at the highest state level. It is known that these were secret orders orally, given directly by the Minister of War Alexander Zhukovsky. But he did not do this on his own initiative - in his memoirs he made it clear that he acted in coordination with the state leaders of the UPR: the Prime Minister Vsevolod Golubovich and Chairman of the Central Rada Mikhail Grushevsky.
The question of Crimea is indeed very interesting. Because according to the Third Universal Council of the Central Rada, Crimea did not belong to the UPR. But this decision was not accidental; it had reasons. In January 1918, the Central Rada decided to consider the Russian Black Sea Fleet stationed in Sevastopol as Ukrainian. The campaign to Crimea and Sevastopol was, first of all, carried out in order to take control of the Black Sea Fleet.
‒ Black Sea Fleet or fleet base?
- Both the base itself and the Black Sea Fleet. In the first half of April 1918, it was quite obvious that it was not enough to tell the Germans “this is ours,” because the Germans could also take it away.
- Why didn’t they think about discussing this at the negotiations in Brest?
- The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk did not provide for the arrival of German troops. It is a very common opinion that, by signing the peace in Brest, the Central Rada invited Austro-German troops to Ukraine, but this is not entirely true. In fact, Ukraine simply made peace.
With a high degree of probability we can say that the Germans invited themselves to Ukraine
But then, under incomprehensible and rather dark circumstances, an appeal appeared, written on behalf of the Ukrainian delegation in Brest-Litovsk to the German people for military assistance. This appeal came as a big surprise to the state leadership of the UPR. Those circumstances have not been fully clarified; with a high degree of probability we can say that the Germans invited themselves to Ukraine.
- But someone signed this invitation from the Ukrainian side?
- These are members of the Ukrainian peace delegation in Brest-Litovsk, but they did not have such powers. At least nothing like that has been found in the archives yet.
- This means that in April 1918 there was a group of Ukrainian troops and a much larger group of German troops in Ukraine. They moved to Crimea. How did the Germans perceive that Ukrainian troops also moved to Crimea?
- This situation, when the Germans were invited in an emergency mode, contained absolute uncertainty: how, who and where should attack. As a result, the state leaders of the UPR were forced to confusedly ask these same representatives in Brest: how will the Germans march, how many troops do they have?..
At the beginning of April, the situation became somewhat clearer - it became clear that the Germans would advance as far as they could.
- Really? They did not go to Petrograd or Moscow.
- The Germans had such plans, but they were not implemented. There was a dispute between diplomats, politicians, and military personnel. But Ukraine was too valuable a source of resources, both food and material. And at the beginning of April it became clear that the Germans would advance at least to the eastern borders of Ukraine, and Crimea was part of their sphere of interests.
Since there were already cases when the Germans took military property for themselves, which was guarded by Ukrainian sentries, it was inappropriate to rely on their mercy in the matter of the Black Sea Fleet.
‒ That is, the Ukrainians and Germans went to Crimea in a race?
- Yes, it was a kind of race. But it cannot be said that this happened only by military means; efforts were also made through diplomatic means. For example, on April 19, the UPR government informed German representatives that the Black Sea Fleet was Ukrainian.
And, looking ahead, I will say: when the Germans entered Sevastopol, they proceeded from the fact that the Black Sea Fleet was Ukrainian, but they would not immediately give it to the Ukrainians, but would keep it under their control for some time. They were afraid that the Russians would take over the leadership and turn it against Germany.
But at the level of declarations, the German commander admitted that this fleet belongs to the Ukrainian People's Republic.
‒ There is a widespread version that the Ukrainian chieftain Petro Bolbochan, at that time a lieutenant colonel, played a decisive role in breaking through the fortifications built on the isthmuses. And it was a very serious operation in terms of military art. As far as I know, you are critical of this version.
- There are some nuances here. First of all, it must be said that the Bolsheviks had very meager forces at their disposal in Crimea, less than five thousand fighters. Black Sea sailors from Sevastopol adopted resolutions and swore allegiance to Soviet power, but were in no hurry to face bullets. Therefore, the Reds had quite a few people.
- But the Bolsheviks fought with the Crimean Tatars.
- At that time they had already managed to suppress the resistance of the Tatars. But they didn’t want to fight the Germans - the Germans were much stronger. Therefore, it was easier for them to sail as far as possible from this front, and some of them did so.
Crimea could be taken through two isthmuses: from the west it is Perekop, and Chongar from the east. It so happened that German troops were approaching Perekop from the west, and Bolbochan’s Ukrainian group was approaching Chongar from the east.
When reconstructing these events, we often turn not to documents, but to some memories. Unfortunately, researchers often follow the path of least resistance.
Returning to those events, the Germans were the first to enter the territory of Crimea. The Reds built a line of defense along both isthmuses. The logic of the fighting dictated the following algorithm: if the defenses on one of the isthmuses are broken through, then there is no point in defending the other. Because these defenders will come from the flank to the rear. This is what happened: on April 18, the vanguard of the German group of the general Roberta von Kosha broke through the Red defenses at Perekop.
‒ What was the Ukrainian group doing at that time?
The Bolshevik regime did not please the majority of the population. First of all, to the Crimean Tatars. Therefore, the Ukrainian troops were greeted very respectfully
- It was approaching. She was in the Melitopol area. The lack of documents does not always make it possible to accurately reproduce the movement of Bolbochan’s group, but the indisputable fact remains that it was the Germans who were the first to break through the Reds’ defense. And while this happened, in fact, the organized defense of the Bolsheviks crumbled. It is no coincidence that one of the participants in those events from the Ukrainian side Nikifor Avramenko then he remembered that they easily entered through Chongar. That's right, it was easy! Because as soon as the Germans destroyed the Red defenses at Perekop, immediately the bulk of Chongar’s defenders also ran to the rear.
‒ How were Ukrainian troops greeted on the peninsula?
- The Bolshevik regime did not please the majority of the population. First of all, to the Crimean Tatars. Therefore, the Ukrainian troops were greeted very respectfully. This is where the bet was placed somewhere in Kyiv. The main goal was the Black Sea Fleet, but it was possible that if, as Ukrainian troops advanced across Crimea, the Tatar population offered some kind of cooperation, some kind of unification, then these options were also considered.
The Germans also took this into account. They greeted the appearance of the Ukrainians very negatively and regarded it as an attempt by the Ukrainian authorities to take Crimea under their control.
-Where did they meet?
- Their paths crossed in Simferopol. On April 23, Ukrainian troops entered Simferopol, and the Germans entered almost on the same day, there was a difference of several hours.
The German command viewed this situation very negatively. From their point of view, it looked like they bore the brunt of the fighting, broke through the Reds’ defenses, and then the Ukrainians emerged from behind, occupied Simferopol and were about to move on.
In Bakhchisaray, the possibility of an alliance between Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars arose. The Germans could not allow this
The conflict went even further when Colonel's regiment Vsevolod Petriva occupied Bakhchisarai. The Crimean Tatars greeted him very joyfully. And the possibility of an alliance between Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars arose. The Germans could not allow this to happen.
The Germans demanded that the Ukrainian military leave the peninsula. Of course, it was not Bolbochan’s competence to decide this. They reported to Kyiv, it reached Golubovich and Grushevsky.
The situation was extremely threatening, because at that time relations with the Germans were already very strained and threatened to develop into open confrontation. Therefore, they decided to retreat - Ukrainian troops left the peninsula.
- What were your plans for Crimea in that situation? Have Kyiv already planned to annex the peninsula to Ukraine?
- There is no written evidence about this. The Central Rada did not consider this issue in this sense.
But everyone understood that the Ukrainian troops were greeted joyfully by the Crimean Tatar population, and prospects appeared to hold negotiations with representatives of the Kurultai on unification, and this could well be realized.
-What were the German plans regarding Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet?
The Germans believed that the territory they occupied by right of war in Crimea, and everything that was there, was a trophy
- The Germans were guided by the fact that formally Crimea was not part of the Ukrainian People's Republic. And the territory that was not part of the UPR, occupied by German troops by the law of war, and everything that is there is a trophy.
Crimea has been and remains a very advantageous strategic springboard. At the beginning of the revolution, the Black Sea Fleet had about 400 warships and various auxiliary vessels. This is quite a powerful military force, and the Germans wanted to control it no less than anyone else.
‒ General Ludendorff, the second person in the German General Staff at that time, was presented with a plan to create a “colonial power” in Crimea. How far have the Germans gone with the implementation of such plans?
“The circumstances of 1918 did not allow them to go far. There were such plans, and if the Germans had won the war or the war on the Western Front had lasted longer, then, quite possibly, these plans would have become a reality.
